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Abstract: 
 
 
This paper is a case study of the Republic of Macedonia (Southeast Europe), which focuses on 
examining governance and enterprise restructuring.  
 
Governance and enterprise restructuring is already defined indicator in EBRD’s studies and 
transition reports, measuring the effective corporate governance and corporate control exercised 
through domestic financial institutions and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring. As of 
the beginning of the transition process, governance and enterprise restructuring remains in the 
center, as essential pillar, that moves forward the society towards developed market economy. 
 
The data used in this article are analyzed with an econometric regression model, which as 
employed in this study examines the interrelationships between governance and enterprise 
restructuring and set of policies that influence the governance patterns. 
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Introduction 
 
The research in this paper is to be focused on examining governance and enterprise restructuring 
in Southeast Europe economies and in particular a case study of the Republic of Macedonia.  
 
EBRD has governance and enterprise restructuring as basic indicator of economic transition and 
defines it as effective corporate governance and corporate control exercised through domestic 
financial institutions and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring. The corporate 
governance is most often defined in terms of the roles, responsibilities, and interactions of top 
management and the board of directors.  
 
Using data of South-East Europe i.e. case study of Macedonia, will be examined the 
interrelationships between governance and enterprise restructuring and set of policies that 
influence the governance patterns. 
 
Literature Review  
 
There are several contemporary theories that set the foundations of governance and enterprise 
restructuring within a framework important for this research.  
 
The institutional setting is of essence when governance and enterprise restructuring is analyzed 
in transition economies. Further, the literature on corporate governance is extensive and is linked 
to important theories, of which the agency theory is fundamentally predominant. The established 
agency theory highlights the function of corporate governance in the overall enterprise 
restructuring, ensuring that the firm protects the interests of shareholders in a given institutional 
context (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus, the institutional setting has impact on the outcome of 
companies’ performance through the very nature of country’s ownership structure and policies 
undertaken to shape the governance system. When companies are analyzed, it is important to 
state the presence of different agency conflicts between shareholders and management in a given 
ownership structure of each country. Hence, different countries have divergent governance 
systems leading to variations in the nature of the agency problems, where according to the ‘law 
and economics’ viewpoint, legal systems craft institutional specificities (La Porta, Lopez-de-
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Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). The literature further proposes that different national 
governance systems are also influenced by cultural and historical features in addition to their 
specific legal system (Hall & Gingerich, 2009).  
 
The links between agency theory and institutional theory (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) explain 
that divergences in national institutions may have significant impact on the effectiveness of 
governance at the firm level (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008).  
 
The law and economics approach (e.g., (La Porta et al., 2000; La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998)) puts the focus on the fact that the ability to enforce financial contracts 
and thus increase the effectiveness of  governance depends on institutional characteristics  
(Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2008; Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006; Hoskisson, 
Cannella, Tihanyi, & Faraci, 2004).  Further, it is stated that in order to complete the frame 
already set by the agency theory it is necessary to merge it with institutional theory (Douma et 
al., 2006; Kaplan, Martel, & Stromberg, 2003). There are two principal strings of institutional 
theory fitted to the analysis: a) the first, origins in political science (North, 1990) and b) the 
second is derived from organizational theory (Scott, 2002). The political science approach 
focuses on the setup where political and economic institutions create incentives for managers and 
the way the outcomes are shaped. On the other hand, the organizational theory approach is 
concerned with the adjusting function of organizations while creating the institutional 
environment. In this regard, Aggarwal and Goodell argue that national corporate governance 
differences between countries used in their study are determined by legal, cultural, and other 
national characteristics (Aggarwal & Goodell, 2010). 
 
1. Corporate Strategies in transition economy environment  
 
As countries undergo serious system transformations the managers are faced with complex 
decision-making environment (Sanders & Mason, 1998), and thus it is closely regarded that the 
performance of large enterprises should be linked to managerial flexibility in making strategic 
decisions within the context of the firm’s governance. Furthermore, there aren’t many sources 
that can point towards emerging corporate governance mechanisms in South-East Europe, 
5 
 
although prior research suggests that independent managers and board of directors (corporate 
governance) may be an important necessity for managerial ability to undertake performance-
enhancing strategies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). Before restructuring, the revenues 
were generated by monopolistic structure through a handful of specialized state-owned 
companies. As the reforms progressed towards free market economy in environment with 
sluggish internal demand, adopting better strategies may be closely linked to better financial 
performance of the firm (Luo & Peng, 1999). Moreover, we can see that previous research has 
linked strategies with performance (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Makhija, 2004), and governance 
directly with performance (Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Peng, 2004), and consequently in this 
research we will make an essay to implement the governance and enterprise restructuring EBRD 
indicator as measure against set of policies. 
 
Economic reforms introduced in Southeast Europe aimed at increasing enterprise efficiency and 
making their products internationally competitive and thus reforms were tied with structural 
crisis (Uhlenbruck, Meyer, & Hitt, 2003). The pre-reform environment that was characterized by 
import protection and export promotion through monopolistic, state-owned foreign trade 
companies which in many terms crippled the enterprises to meet overseas threats and as a result 
made the internationalization of their work very difficult. As liberalization of the market forces 
and privatization progressed they were meant to eliminate the constraints imposed on managers 
by state ownership and command economy system (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Makhija, 2004). In 
the case of the Southeast Europe, companies were privatized using range of methods (Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Djankov & Murrell, 2002). Thus, the privatization process resulted with 
diverse range of ownership structures and governance mechanisms (Newman, 2000). 
 
The corporate governance affects enterprises restructuring and financial performance (Hoskisson 
et al., 2000; Peng, 2004). Indeed, when firms from transition economies are involved in 
international activities, they are likely to develop their capabilities (Luo & Peng, 1999; Sanders 
& Mason, 1998). As a consequence of the peculiar characteristics of the capital markets in 
South-East Europe i.e. lack of well developed capital markets, limited portfolio diversification 
and liquidity, it is often stated that large shareholders could wish to utilize potential upside of a 
particular business strategy, but they are frequently restrained and affected adversely by the 
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company’s idiosyncratic risk1 (Maug, 1998). Due to this phenomenon they chose to impose sub-
optimal strategies on managers. Moreover, large shareholders in transition countries where the 
protection of minority investors is low, most often endeavor to take advantage of their power and 
grasp “private benefits of control”. This ‘expropriation’ can be found  in a range of forms, such 
as ‘related party transactions, use of transfer pricing, assets stripping and other forms of 
“tunnelling” of revenue and assets from firms’ (Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). Therefore, in such economies high 
ownership concentration was investors’ response to low levels of protection of minority 
shareholders in emerging markets (Hitt, Keats, & DeMarie, 1998; Porta et al., 1997). Even 
though we analyze and focus specifically on Macedonia, variations in governance regimes 
indicate sufficient international analyses of governance and enterprise restructuring in the 
specific group of economies that undergo serious difficulties in transformation.  
 
Corporate governance and enterprise restructuring in Macedonia 
 
1. Institutional and legal framework  
 
a) The institutional framework is essential in the development of the governance and 
enterprise restructuring process. There institutions that carry of the process are the 
Securities Commission and the Macedonian Stock Exchange and  are aided by the 
Central Securities Depository (IFC, 2008). 
 
b) The legal framework is comprised of sets of laws and regulations including the first 1996 
Company Law its enactment of 2004, as well as, the Securities Law, the Law on 
Takeovers, the Bankruptcy Law, and the Macedonian Stock Exchange’s corporate 
governance code and listing rules (IFC, 2008). 
 
 
                                               
1 Another term for  unsystematic risk. The variability in the returns of an investment as a result of factors specific to 
that investment only. 
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2. Overall assessment of corporate governance characteristics  
 
Macedonia’s corporate governance model is consistently built since the beginning of transition to 
modern market economy. Thus, it complies with the notion that each country shapes its 
particular way of governance due to its own history, culture, and legal and regulatory framework 
(Aggarwal & Goodell, 2010; La Porta et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1998; Porta et al., 1999; Porta 
et al., 1997). The main characteristics of the Macedonian corporate governance model are (IFC, 
2008):  
 
a) Gradual concentration of ownership which is reflected through policies leading to 
dispersed ownership structure of companies to become concentrated over time in a more 
regular manner. As 2007 IFC Corporate Governance Manual for Macedonian Companies 
indicates around 300,000 individuals become shareholders in the first phase of the 
privatization process. Later the process reinforced itself and eventually resulted with 
255,000 in 2004 and 105,000 in August 2007 individuals as shareholders. This was result 
due imposed regulatory reform (Company Law, 1996) and also the development of the 
capital market urging for voluntary decisions of shareholders to sell their shares on the 
Macedonian Stock Exchange, characterized with constant default on minority 
shareholders’ and investor protection during this period. However, with creation of the 
Central Securities Depository (state authority for securities registration), the quality of the 
process had improved.  
 
b) Company shareholders as company employees and vice-versa, describes the phenomenon 
of the dual role and mutual interaction of these two categories as most of the employees 
are at the same time shareholders in the company. Thus, there is conflict in the rights and 
the duties as these two roles, which in essence oppose themselves and exclude each other. 
Indeed, this characteristic is problem of many transition economies and needs time to be 
resolved, while is still producing mixed outcomes.  
 
c) As a consequence of the previous two, there is the third main characteristic of the 
Macedonian economy in light of governance and enterprise restructuring i.e. lack of 
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separation of company’s ownership from company’s control. This practice, despite the 
introduced regulation, is still lagging, hence the unfortunate problem where majority-vote 
shareholders who most often hold companies’ top positions, trigger overwhelming 
influence over comprehensive daily work of the enterprise. Further, this reduces and 
prevents the control systems’ vigilance and reporting to and from shareholders and 
investors.  
 
d) The forth important feature derived from the previous, is the inadequate oversight of 
management’s work. This is due the fact that members of the supervisory board are 
individuals with lack of experience directly appointed by the controlling majority 
shareholders or in submission to the very persons that they are supposed to control. 
 
 
Research hypotheses 
 
Two basic hypotheses to test governance and enterprise restructuring: 
 
 1st Hypothesis: Governance and enterprise restructuring depend on set of policies : large-
scale privatization, small-scale privatization, price liberalization, competition policy, 
trade and foreign exchange system, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, 
securities markets and non-bank financial institutions and overall infrastructure reform; 
and ,  
 
 2nd Hypothesis: Governance and enterprise restructuring is significant and improves over 
time due to imposed policies. 
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Sample selection and Data 
 
It this paper it is used the same econometric model as in the first article.  
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition Report series have 
the latest information on the countries that are classified in transition. The data that this 
prominent organization offers are based on wide network of sources that they obtain from 
national and international authorities (Bennett, 2004a, 2004b; Zinnes, Eilat, & Sachs, 2001). 
EBRD tracks reforms and assesses the overall process of transition using set of transition 
indicators, which are formed in comparison to the standards of industrialized market economies.  
 
Further, the data sample is mainly drawn from the extended research and data bases of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Transition Report publication 
series. Consequently, the data used in this research are taken from their index structure 
‘economic statistics and forecasts’ (EBRD, 1994-2009). The scale used in shaping the transition 
indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, ‘where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally 
planned economy and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy’ (EBRD, 
1994-2009). There are detailed numbers for the countries in transition analyzing the period of 
1989 to 2009 in different areas. These indicators are sorted by sector and country and are 
analyzing nine arias: large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and 
enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition 
policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions, and overall infrastructure reform (EBRD, 1994-2009; Gouret, 2007).  
 
Model and Econometrics  
 
The econometric model that is used in this study is a regression model where we have estimated 
the fallowing equation (Freedman, 2005): 
 
ipipio xxi   ...11    (1) 
ni ,...1    (2) 
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Thus, applied to our research this model has the fallowing shape: 
 
titititititioti OIRSMNBFIBRIRLTFSCPPLSSPLSPGOV ,t i,8t  i,7t i,6,5,4,3,2,1,  
(3) 
 where  the dependent variable, tiGOV , . shows governance and enterprise restructuring;  
 the independent variables, are as follows :  
1. tiLSP ,  large-scale privatization;  
2. tiSSP ,  small-scale privatization;  
3. tiPL ,  price liberalization; 
4. tiCP , competition policy;  
5. tiTFS ,  trade and foreign exchange system;  
6. t i,BRIRL banking reform and interest rate liberalization;  
7. t  i,SMNBFI securities markets and non-bank financial institutions;  
8. t i,OIR overall infrastructure reform; 
   is a p-dimensional parameter vector ;  
  is the error term or noise. 
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Results and Effects 
 
The first hypothesis is that governance and enterprise restructuring depend on set of policies: 
large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, price liberalization, competition policy, trade 
and foreign exchange system, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets 
and non-bank financial institutions and overall infrastructure reform. The transition theory 
explains well the effects of privatization, restructuring, competition, budget constraints, policies 
of governance and management (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). 
  
The country results of the OLS regression for Macedonia (Figure 2) show that there are good 
results on correlation and dependence of governance and enterprise restructuring to large-scale 
privatization. However, the coefficients are negative pointing towards possible lag of governance 
mostly because of country specific dispersed ownership and agency conflicts as analyzed before 
(CG Manuel-IFC, 2007). The variable explaining trade and foreign exchange system and its 
relation to GOV behaves with mixed outcome depending on the model.   Further, the price 
liberalization variable shows good results and there is good evidence and correlation between 
country’s governance, as well as, positive impact on GOV.   
 
The banking reform of the system and the interest rate liberalization demonstrated good results in 
contribution to the governance and enterprise restructuring. In this analysis the overall 
infrastructure reform has given important input in improving the overall economic governance, 
but the negative sign suggests some concern, as the disinvestment in infrastructure is constant lag 
in transition countries. 
 
On the other hand, governance and enterprise restructuring have strong relation to the small-scale 
privatization; competition policy and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. In 
the case of these variables, the models have shown evidence i.e. p < 0.001(and p < 0.05). 
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Figure I.1 Results of OLS on Macedonia 
 
OLS
Independ
ent 
Variable [1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]
lsp -0.0400841 -0.0718089 -0.0403039 -0.0307779 -0.0546197
[0.0844591] [0.1341494] [0.0802903] [0.0713962] [0.0730469]
ssp 0.954126 0.9522068 0.9881459 0.9583012
[0.2081172]*** [0.1715753]*** [0.1410507]*** [0.2009124]***
pl 0.0632146 -0.0857734 0.0617463 0.0625092 0.0386737
[0.1236557] [0.190142] [0.0891231] [0.1190298] [0.1024566]
tfs -0.0019025 0.2475254 -0.0020039 0.0035742
[0.1059441] [0.1448785] [0.1020113] [0.1014893]
cp 0.3170152 0.3173858 0.3167068 0.3163479 0.2908476
[0.0978953]*** [0.1560151]* [0.0925978]*** [0.0942207]*** [0.0681516]***
brirl 0.0324758 0.4920464 0.0324864 0.031418
[0.141122] [0.158304]*** [0.1355862] [0.1363957]
smnbfi 0.2358248 0.1866295 0.235749 0.2379681 0.2128045
[0.101816]** [0.16136] [0.0977389]** [0.0976263]** [0.0796935]**
oir -0.0878511 -0.1422885 -0.0873017 -0.0868301
[0.2280277] [0.3629135] [0.2171038] [0.2195233]
Constant -2.513445 -0.0655663 -2.507403 -2.592015 -2.495099
[0.5982257]*** [0.4299509] [0.4752273]*** [0.4729974]*** [0.5764654]***
Observatio
ns
R-squared 0.9085 0.9182 0.9385 0.8884 0.9283
Adj R-sqrd 0.7808 0.7511 0.7822 0.7822 0.782
Time 
period 
Significanc
e Level: *** p < 0.01  ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Macedonia
189
1989-2009
Dependent Variable
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
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The second hypothesis is that the variable governance and enterprise restructuring is significant 
and improves over time due to imposed policies. 
 
In the analysis (Figure 1) the results confirm this hypothesis with some mixed outcomes i.e. 
sluggishly improves over time. In fact, the close relation with number of these policies shows the 
significant impact of these policies to the way the governance and enterprise restructuring was 
imposed, positively or negatively.  Thus, there is significant correlation to SSP, CP, BRIRL and 
SMNBFI, presenting outcomes to how each of these variables impacts GOV.  Nonetheless, over 
time most of the variables improved and it is clear that there is relationship between them 
moving upwards. 
 
Further in Figure 2 we can see the movements of governance and enterprise restructuring over 
time. Also, in this case the analyzed variable moved alongside the increase of the other variables 
and towards positive upward climb. Figure 3 indicates that even though there is positive 
movement up, governance and enterprise restructuring is still at the bottom of estimated policies’ 
progress.  
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Figure I.2 Macedonia’s Governance and Enterprise Restructuring 
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Figure I.3 Indicators’ Dynamics 
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Discussion  
 
On the first assumption that governance and enterprise restructuring depend on imposed set of  
policies, the analysis showed that there are mixed outcomes. There are positive and negative 
influences that eventually bring satisfactory picture for the overall governance and enterprise 
restructuring. 
 
On the other hand, due to analysis of the second assumption it is clear that as the transition 
process progressed along with the imposed reforms and there is a positive inclination of 
governance and enterprise restructuring. 
 
However, there is still more to be done in order to bring these economies closer to the standards 
of developed ones. Indeed, it is needed considerable improvement of corporate governance, 
institution-building to control agency problems and imposing already adopted  regulation, as 
well as, enforcing new enterprise restructuring policies, within existing policies of overall 
transition economy restructuring. 
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